Tim, I’ve added a footnote, number 5, with Gödel’s assertions about the vacuity of verificationism as it is used in science. The source of that assertion is his private correspondence with Hao Wang dated 7 December 1997, Gödel Collected Works [GCW], vol. V, p. 397.

That said, I think you may have misconstrued my analogical use of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem with my own assertions — clearly our understanding is always a work-in-process, and thus there will always be things we know which we cannot understand. If we could, we probably wouldn’t be in the trouble we are today.

My assertion of this incompleteness of our understanding is directed towards the goal of this essay, which is to show the faults of an axiomatic understanding, which is frozen by the rigidity of its own “obvious,” i.e., axiomatic, contents.